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This paper questions the assumption of the bulk of Western philosophy that reasoning in 
general, and moral reasoning in particular, can be undertaken without any consideration 
of the unique cultural experiences of those who engage in it. It proposes a communitarian 
alternative for thinking about subjecthood. It further contends that there is need for 
professional African philosophers to assist their people in the quest for solutions to 
current pertinent socio-economic challenges facing them. 
 
Introduction: Autonomy of Reason Reconsidered 
The present paper was delivered to the conference on “Philosophy in East Africa: towards 
Critical Thinking, Professionalism and Democracy”, held in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, 18th to 
20th November, 2009. 
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For many years now, UNESCO has been at the center of conferences that reflect on the 
philosophical underpinnings of culture. And for even longer time is UNESCO’s 
promotion of awareness about, and the development of cultural values around the world. 
The promotion of the recordings of people’s languages and histories, within and across 
cultures, are well known UNESCO projects. Historians should be acquainted with the 
authoritative UNESCO General History of Africa. And many philosophers will probably 
recall the several anthologies across the continent and elsewhere which are results of 
Unesco-organized conferences. In East Africa particularly, readers will recall the volume, 
Philosophy and Cultures,  co-edited by the late Henry Odera Oruka and myself in 1983. 
Among the most recent of such efforts was the publication of the proceedings of the 
Cotonou conference of 2004 under the title  La rationalité, une ou plurielle? edited by 
Paulin J. Hountondji (2007). Not to be ignored are the many other conferences and 
seminars whose proceedings have yet to be converted into published texts. 
 
A title such as that of Hountondji’s anthology mentioned above is significant for several 
reasons. One of them is that it indicates a leap into a novel terrain - one that escapes the 
strictures and inertia of the Oxford school of rationality of the 1970s. It does this despite 
the fact that its title betrays the international and multi-cultural format of many Unesco-
organized meetings.  Recent shifts in philosophical inquiry have witnessed drifts from 
fictitious objectivisms and universalisms to how people express differently their 
motivations or frame their experiences in response to the vast and diverse needs of life 
across the globe. The point is simple enough - that while it can be assumed that there are 
many things in the world to which people react and with which they act, what cannot be 
assumed is what those things are like. What has clearly become important is the 
interrogation, not of which universal principles will sustain the quest for and help attain 
one truth for all, but rather what humanly worthy goals, and which motivations, warrant 
pursuit with the best and most complete rational means for the improvement and 
sustenance of good living which includes the recognition and respect for the dignity of all 
humans.1 
                                                
1 Please note that I have said, very deliberately,  “dignity of all humans” rather than “human dignity” which 
has been susceptible to a monolithic, essentialist, oppressive, and exclusionist European narrative. By 
contrast, “the dignity of all humans” gives room for a pluralistic and, therefore, democratic understanding 
of possible rational choices in the experiences of people. 
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These new attitudes signal a significant shift from, and are often aimed at the supposition 
at the center of the so-called “modernity”, namely that objectivity was not only a good 
idea, but that it was indeed possible, its conditions identifiable and definable, and 
ultimately imposable as the guiding goals of policy in public institutions as well as of 
moral ideals in private conduct and in personal relations. Those assumptions, crafted 
elsewhere, became the guiding principles of the idea of “progress”, and informed the 
nineteenth-century ideologies of global power and domination; we became its victims as 
colonialism and imperialism carried and spread those ideologies abroad from Europe. In 
the vision of this ideology, there was just one, universal, and commonly attainable 
terminus ad quem for humanity, and the best power system, built on the unfettered 
liberties of the individual, could, and had to, make it happen. There was only one 
problem: that the claimed “humanity” viewed through the values that were identified for 
and by it, and the political and moral values and orders attached to its possibility, were all 
European. Of course, objectivity remains always a good idea and ideal that we can 
meaningfully strive for. But that is all that it is: an ideal that helps and guides us to search 
for the best in human endeavors, and to sharpen the skills that serve the imagination. The 
realm of practice, however, does not always lead to concurrence. 
 
Modern European philosophers were notorious for taking to be universal what was 
actually specific to European cultural changes and adjustments to time, and we now know 
that only the dominant visions of those adjustments were communicated and spread down 
the generations as content of preferred and protected values, together with the 
methodological systems that wrapped them up with justifying theoretical schemes. 
Thomas Kuhn’s work in the theory and historical growth of scientific knowledge 
exemplifies how contestations within knowledge systems generally sift and retain only 
the strong aspects that guarantee it survival.2 Philosophy is no exception to this 
                                                
2 Think of the accounts of the suppression of rival findings in the interest of market gains and dominance in 
the pharmaceutical industry; or think of the now-unmasked suppression of data advising against 
questionable drilling decisions in the petroleum industry. How many human lives, or how much of 
environmental tracts and spaces, could have been saved had rival theories had their way in those example 
cases? The point is that the rival positions were not necessarily scientifically inferior to those that became 
normative. 
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evolutionary progression of systems and things through moments of “normalcy” and 
subsequent subversion. Hegel had seen this dialectic in the human spirit before Darwin 
said it of organisms. It is important to note here, however, that these observations do not 
diminish for the human spirit the cultural factor about the specific adaptations, for only 
what makes its way into accepted or  “normal” practice subsequently gets to be 
communicated to future generations. This is what brings me to the consideration of the 
obligation that hangs upon us, as members of our societies and institutions with the 
privilege to attend to our own people’s problems by identifying, defining and rationally 
examining, through insightful discourse, the values that best serve us in our desires to 
preserve life and to improve its quality for all of us. 
 
Taming our Ever Present Past 
To be sure, like all creative and epoch-changing intellectual traditions, contemporary 
philosophical thought that advocate certain crucial freedoms for the individual, and by 
extension advocate a pluralistic world erected on rational principles, arises in recognition 
of several things. First, it is in recognition of evolved epistemological and moral tenets 
from those positions of the past that became the bases of oppression of persons whether 
as individuals or as members of communities and nations. While rejecting the untenable 
aspects of the past is not always a welcome or comfortable undertaking for all, it is a duty 
for those upon whom society bestows the privilege of being researchers and thinkers of 
divers callings. There are discomforting matters in our societies which should cause 
conceptual and moral pain to any conscientious person whose understanding urges him or 
her to stop an evil, or one or the other of the calamities of varying proportions in our 
midst. 
 
How many of you have had the unfortunate opportunity to converse with a person of the 
village who claims that a witch-doctor, as we have grown to call these con artists, 
removed a golf-ball-sized animal hairball from under the skin in their belly because they 
had not been able to go to the bathroom for three days? If we know our biology well, we 
should know that removing such a large foreign object from under the skin anywhere on 
the human body would require a pretty large incision that would later require a 
proportionate number of stitches to patch up. Their story is that witch-doctors do not 
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leave marks on their patients, something that I always think should have turned them into 
some of the most coveted plastic surgeons in this age of bodily manipulations. Be that as 
it may, the story does not even include an explanation of how the huge lump of hair 
would have come to be so embedded under the skin in the first place. 
 
Many times narrators of such sad inventions know that you went to school, but either 
have no clue about what you gain there, or they just do not give regard to what your 
formal education may have exposed you to, so they expect you to go along. And when 
you object, chances are that you will be admonished for being “young” and lacking in 
understanding. In other words, because they do not associate learning with inquiry into 
the same world you share, it does not occur to them that you could have a different 
understanding of how the world works. School, and the learning associated with it, is 
about distant matters that do not - and dare not - separate you from them. This is a 
narrative version of the long debate that many of you might have detected already as 
stemming from that controversial school fancily called ethnophilosophy.3 But to cut the 
very long story really short, please consider Hountondji’s warning about letting the two 
orders stand side-by-side.4 Here is the danger: while those who are buried in the 
customary order do not suffer the pain of conceptual confusion even as they die 
unnecessary deaths, those of us who are acquainted with both and can tell the difference 
risk all the pitfalls that come with intellectual dishonesty. We face our own challenges, 
and we ought to pick up the responsibility that they bestow upon us. Unless the media 
reports we read intentionally mislead us, someone should address at least some of the 
issues which we notice to emerge around us. Indeed, besides the moral concerns that the 
examples I have in mind raise, they also are definitely based on skewed biological 
assumptions that we cannot ignore. Below, then, are some examples. 
                                                
3 There are positive ways of looking at the term “ethnophilosophy”, but I refer here to the now-well known 
group of scholars whose work, by virtue of it’s supposedly philosophical claims  and quality, or lack 
thereof, earned this name from Hountondji, but with a pejorative connotation. That critique is now well 
known and requires no elaboration here. 
4 See his African Philosophy, Myth and Reality (Second edition), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
1996, especially the new “Preface”. A better defense of his critique of ethnophilosophy can now be found in 
his The Struggle for Meaning: Reflections on Philosophy, Culture, and Democracy in Africa (English 
transl. John Conte-Morgan) Athens, OH: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 2002. 
124 D.A. Masolo 
 
First, we are called upon, collectively and as individual thinkers, to deliberate the deeply 
worrisome episodes of genocide. On what warranting grounds, and how warranting are 
those grounds, we should ask, that anyone can or should deserve to die only because he or 
she lives by a different set of cultural traditions, or because he or she claims to be of a 
different ethnic group than my own, or because he or she calls his or her deity by that 
other different name, and worships differently than I do?  Or, again, what connections 
would there be between having red eyes and a bloated belly, or having a discolored skin, 
and moral guilt? And what if the person bearing such bodily characteristics is even a 
child? And, finally, even if by reason of some twist in the mind we answered approvingly 
of the latter few questions, it still remains unclear what kind of punishment is warranted 
by moral wrongs. I have read stories recently, and seen gory images, of children being 
killed in some regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and in parts of the Delta 
region of Nigeria by their own kin for having red eyes and bloated bellies. To those 
making the judgements, these conditions were “proof” that the children were witches who 
deserved death. In highly volatile and unstable conditions such as define the socio-
economic circumstances of the DRC, nutrition is bound to be a problem to everyone, let 
alone children who become prime victims of war, famine, and other socially ravaging 
situations. How can well-known signs of malnutrition become signs of moral culpability 
which we are seen to be happy to meet with the ultimate punishment? 
 
We have been told in widespread media reports that in East Africa, and in Tanzania in 
particular, persons with albinism are being killed. There is deep concern globally among 
human rights activists that such persons are being left to die at the hands of town and 
village mobs or witchdoctors who brand them as “bad omen” to their collective well-
being, and dismembered body parts of these innocent victims of sheer murder are used for 
ritual purposes. The general view from a human rights perspective is that the government 
response is minimal and appears to be limited only to face-saving action when considered 
against the numbers of victims who have already fallen to these acts of savagery. What 
appears to be totally absent is the intellectual response when these acts happen on the 
basis of refutable knowledge claims. So, without amusement, we should ask ourselves: 
how does one become blame-worthy in any shape or form, let alone being judged to be 
punishable by death, for how one is born, such as being born with deficiency in the 
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amount of melanine required for skin pigmentation? What is the exact content of the 
knowledge that informs or warrants such extreme actions against our kin and neighbors? 
In other words, besides the legal ramifications of the lynching of such innocent persons, 
we also have the moral and biological misconceptions to tackle. While the judicial system 
will punish wrong-doers, perpetrators of wrongs remain likely to repeat their crimes 
unless the knowledge that spurs the act is corrected. Being caught may disrupt the timing 
and perhaps the degree of an act, but it does not necessarily deter its repeat so long as its 
premises remain intact. Our unavoidable challenge can be framed in the following 
question form: On who does the responsibility of correcting such misconceptions fall? 
We may not be directly responsible for these obvious crimes meted undeservedly on our 
fellow humans, but we are no less culpable when we see and disapprove of them being 
committed by others yet fail to address them. 
 
Media lenses focused on Africa are not only about the killings. They are also recording 
Africans’ participation in the growing global issue of sexuality, one of contemporary 
society’s biggest challenges to the power and resilience of sheer belief, pitting customary 
morals against liberal values . The issue of sexuality is not only related to matters of 
choice of sexual orientation,  but also to what it is about biology and sexuality that drive 
us as societies to be selectively discriminatory, exploitative, and outrightly oppressive of 
persons of specific genders as we often are when it comes to access to resources and other 
socially enhancing opportunities. This kind of concern does not, however, dim the 
importance and equal urgency of the ethical and moral issue at the center of recent shocks 
to East Africans in regard to revelations of the presence of different sexual orientations 
and practices in our communities. In that specific regard, a bait has even been thrown 
directly to philosophers to enter this discussion by the outspokenness of those who are 
currently charged with helping us identify and discuss possible future directions for legal 
regulation of our public conduct. With all these issues and concerns to consider as we 
think about the value and quality of life for all of us, why, I wonder, would anyone ask 
what it is that is African in African philosophy? 
 
The issues I am talking about do not entail a discussion of a moral crisis in regard to 
sexuality among ETs. I believe many of you have read about Kenyans making history in 
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Great Britain by being the first legally married gay couples there. We don’t as 
philosophers have to preach about these matters in street corners or even in our 
classrooms, unless our concerns require some activism as part of our demand for better 
rationally grounded societies. Instead, we can spurr a fruitful and informative debate by 
asking subtle questions in response to the reactions these news often evoke.5 Philosophers 
are expected to understand some things well, including the risky business of standing up 
for what is reasonable, right, and just. As Shaaban bin Robert once said, no good or 
rationally worthy practice can be instituted as a norm in society without deliberation 
(mazungumzo)6. Certainly ahead of his time by many decades, he stood for the rights of 
women when custom, or even worse, just sheer habit cultivated in colonial economy and 
social structures, denied our mothers, sisters, spouses, aunts, and grandmothers the sheer 
dignity of a voice and recognition. 
 
It is our time, the time, for philosophers to rise up because there is no other criterion that 
would make these issues, and thinking about them, more African than they already are. 
Focusing on them as our issues will place us on the path to a rational autonomy by 
reading and discussing everything else with informed skepticism. But we can read, or re-
read as the case may be,  E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among 
the Azande (1938). There, we might, for anyone who still thinks that there is need to 
define what is African about these matters, run into subtle grounds for ruptures in systems 
of morality across the globe. For me, the primary and most important question we should 
all ask  is: why does anyone need morality? And where do we originate our moral laws 
from, or, put another way, how do we become aware of which moral principles are 
rationally better than others, and why? 
                                                
5 I know that some debates on these matters have been built on concepts and value signifiers that are 
identified with the Western world, especially the term “liberal”. But think of it this way: who does not 
desire freedom? Or ask if we have considered all aspects of freedom, or which ones are not crucial to a 
reasonably decent human life that every human being has a right to, and whether freedom of choice of 
reasonable lifestyle that is harmless to oneself and to others equally free to choose is not one of them. 
6Shaaban Robert’s concerns were with values in their appearance and application toward achievement and 
sustenance of a social order regulated by virtuous principles as the only way to  protect the interests of 
ordinary people in their daily lives. Hence his idea of deliberation was rendered in the form of mazungumzo 
or conversations, but there is no doubt that, with appropriate institutional imagination, this idea of 
mazungumzo would not be extended to academic deliberations. After all, he frequently set the search for the 
values in dialogical settings reminiscent of the Socratic renditions.    
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Illusions of Disinterested Reason 
Accounts of our recent crimes across the continent fly in the face of the popular claims, 
by politicians and scholars alike, that the sacredness of life is the heart of African modes 
of thought. How do we explain the millions of innocent lives lost in the incessant wars of 
our post-colonial history? How do we explain the undignifying rituals, such as female 
child genital mutilation, or the rape of the female child misnamed “marriage”, that rob our 
children of respectable growth and lives? How do we explain our governments’ inaction, 
and the uncaring attitudes of the privileged, in the face of dehumanizing forms of poverty 
and famine? Many of these situations would not decimate our communities if we treated 
life with the sacredness that we vainly and insincerely claim it has for us. Or should we 
ask how suddenly life got to be so secular and worthless? But I believe that sacredness is 
a metaphor for the high value we bestow on things, and nothing can surpass life in any 
order of values. 
 
We risk becoming accomplices in evil, unless we can rise up to ask the pertinent 
questions that will bring a sense of security and equal self-worth to and for all of us. We 
cannot sit in conferences, or in our campus offices and classrooms, doubting ourselves by 
asking that someone show us what African philosophy is, or by listening to European 
tricksters who tell us that we cannot be doing African philosophy unless we speak in our 
own mother tongues while we surrender intellectual leadership to village quacks. Be 
weary of such people because they are no worse than the village quacks killing persons 
with albinism in our midst. The time for these misfits has been long gone, and we can 
carefully identify genuine and serious collaborators in the cultivation and development of 
the human good through leveled dialogue.  On our part we need to show that our 
education carries some worth for our societies by addressing the epistemological, moral, 
and other philosophically significant issues that contemporary beliefs and practices are 
throwing at us. 
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Issues vs. the “How” of Philosophy 
How should we approach the discussion of our problems? My answer is that it does not 
matter, so long as we adhere to the maxims of thorough understanding and explanation of 
issues. Again, Shaaban Robert left us excellent examples of such dialogues. More 
recently, at the University of Dar es Salaam, Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba worked so hard 
at the idea of visualizing knowledge production as a local process. His quest in this regard 
was a continuation of what some Tanzanian thinkers had long given leadership in, 
especially in the well-known knowledge production theories of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. 
Our suggestions at solutions will come from our deliberations of whether what is claimed 
to be the case, in any of the examples I gave above, is really so, and from whether, again 
given our explanations, the disputed solutions are warranted, or even good at all. I take it 
that among philosophers, such an approach to issues may lie heavily on conceptual 
analysis, without making that method, for all that it is worth, an end unto itself. 
 
To be honest, I find the rift between analytic philosophy and any other approach to be a 
matter that is pretty unnecessary to our goals, and the idea of “philosophy for its own 
sake” a deeply dishonest intellectual position. But that does not mean that our training as 
philosophers takes place in departments that act as molds of sorts: it is the nature of the 
academy. What we should not forget is that schools are some of the most ideologized 
places one can ever walk into, and our sojourn and molding within these ideological 
frameworks of the academy are the trademarks they imprint on our minds, and they 
follow us later to see how we represent them on their behalf. So I want to assume that if 
you were molded in the corridors where the influence of Frege and his following in the 
movement of the Nineteen-twenties is predominant, you probably want to call yourself an 
analytic philosopher. If, on the other hand, you were molded by the hands that got their 
casting in the Hegelian foundry, you are likely to call yourself a “European 
continentalist”. The latter, and in fact both designations, can be pretty meaningless. 
 
Elsewhere (Masolo 2010, 1-2), I have referred to a collaboration on an article in 1993 between 
V.Y. Mudimbe and Kwame Anthony Appiah (Mudimbe and Apiyah 1993, 113-138), not 
only because they themselves discussed the unusefulness of the rift and sometimes 
irreconcilable animosity between the representatives of these intellectual lineages in the 
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European practice of philosophy, but also because it had to take two Africans, 
outstanding in their own respective rights as magisterial representatives of these two 
methods - professionally acquired by them in the course of their respective sojourns in the 
European corridors where they were tools of practice as made available to them as part of 
the package of their political adoption - to point out that such a rift does not do justice to 
the need for an integrative approach to knowledge-production.7 Their point is that there is 
more to gain from a collaboration between any set of good methods that help us do what 
our discipline calls on us to do. 
 
If, therefore, we have learned to do philosophy by asking what it is that justifies certain 
claims, or makes some better or more obliging than others, then we should pay far less 
attention to the boundaries of method. Instead, we should adopt and apply them, any of 
them, together or separately as occasion may require, but as diligently as possible, as they 
may best serve us in the task of creating the best understanding of the world around us. 
So, if, for example, I was deliberating the problems I listed above, I would ask, as a way 
of addressing issues of gender and racial inequity in our midst,  what it is that a person’s 
body constitution or skin pigmentation does to his or her capacities in relevant 
circumstances as to warrant differential treatment in respect to those with similar relevant 
or required capacities for performing a task. That way we get to address the assumptions 
upon which various forms of discrimination are built. In more specific relation to the 
exemplary issues I started with, we would ask what it is about being a victim of 
malnutrition that deprives a child of his or her fundamental human rights. Even while it 
remains one of the most controversial forms of punishment of fellow human beings, death 
is legally administered on others only on the grounds of grave crimes. So, we may ask, 
what is it about being malnourished, or being deprived  — on the strength of our known 
genetic heredity — of expected skin pigmentation as a result of deficiency in the specific 
hormone that does the job, that would warrant putting persons suffering those conditions 
to death? Or how does their condition, which is purely physiological, affect the well-
being of their neighbors? 
                                                
7 The methods in themselves may not be “European”, but engagement in the warfare between them is what 
becomes a deep and unnecessary surrogation of a European agendum. 
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On blaming and murdering our children for being malnourished, the double tragedy faced 
by these innocents should not escape anyone, as such acts amount to exterminating those 
who already are victims of socio-economic circumstances brought on by our own failures. 
The wars over ethnic hegemony, or over control of illicit trade spurred by corruption, are 
not only senseless and unnecessary, but also create the chain of effects from which 
malnutrition results. The case of persons with albinism , as I have already indicated, is a 
genetic condition for which noone bears responsibility in the moral sense of the term. As 
a result, no victim bears any blame in either case. But how do we get to be aware of the 
appropriate responses to the specific moral issues related to these examples from a pre-
determined (a priori) moral principles? Social conflicts, like biological malfunctions due 
to rogue hormones, are unpredictable in their specifics, much less the kind of concerns 
they are likely to generate. But if my interest were to take the direction of the location and 
origin of the moral principles themselves, then, on the basis of what I already know to be 
suggestions in this matter, I would probably take and compare Immanuel Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals, or the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, on the one 
hand, and Shaaban Robert’s Kusadikika, on the other. 
 
Who, upon reading and contrasting these works, would still say that we have a 
methodological crisis in philosophy in this continent?  I urge that you do not restrain your 
students from indulging in all the texts available out there, but it will be your duty to point 
out the virtues of the methods that set them apart, as well as the similarity of the 
circumstances from which they sprung in the minds of their respective authors.8 In doing 
so, I trust, you will be achieving what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, a leading Indian-born 
postcolonial scholar and theorist, has said recently about how to put the European text to 
the service of our own quests rather than the other way round (Spivak 1999). For all of us, 
                                                
8 The backdrop of Kant’s work is Martin Luther’s protest against Ecclesiastical hegemony in matters of 
knowledge, morality, and destiny - values which his philosophy bestows on every individual as capable, in 
autonomy from any institutional hegemony, to arrive at truths as his rational capacity, sometimes mediated 
by the nature of the object of knowledge itself, allows him. Neither custom nor any type of organized 
powerhouse has any business shepherding humans to its own perceptions of truths. Shaaban Robert’s work, 
on the other hand, sprang from his reflections on the succession of the powers of domination in Eastern and 
Central Africa, slavery, and the rise of the economy of native marginalization instituted by these systems 
with which Islam and Christianity bore only a paradoxical relationship. While preaching moral systems 
inimical to the core values of the oppressive power systems, the religious institutions lacked the ability to 
deliver veritable social transformation. 
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but especially for our young philosophers, whether you are still in school, recently 
graduated, or just starting on your career, Spivak’s critique of European philosophers 
from a postcolonial standpoint should be embraced as an important lesson, not by 
adopting everything she says, but by taking up the challenge that we do not read anything 
without asking crucial questions about where the philosopher speaks from in terms of the 
particular historical and societal issues that he or she would be speaking from and to. That 
lesson is old now, yet, at the same time, no lesson loses its salt until everyone it is meant 
for has heard and learned from it. Do not read or teach Hegel, Kant, Marx, or even John 
Rawls more recently, as if their claims were rarified universals, whatever those may be. 
Instead, ask what there is in them that might resonate with your own situation. 
 
Kant and the Disinterested Reason 
The mention of Kant here is instructively deliberate. The liberal movement in our time 
has made Kant not just a great philosopher, but the greatest philosopher of our time. At 
least one reason for this rallying around Immanuel Kant’s philosophy by today’s social 
and moral theorists of the liberal creed is Kant’s view of the nature and role of reason, 
especially in moral judgements. Although embodied and dependent on the senses in its 
quest to attain truths about the starry heavens above and the stark objects around us, in 
moral judgements, he thought, reason is capable of extricating itself from the baggage of 
distractions which come with the corporeality of the knower. As in our knowledge of the 
external world of objects, Kant speculated, it was possible to chart out the dimensions of 
our knowledge of “the moral law within us”. In the moral domain, the objective is to 
determine, or define, that cardinal principle on the basis of which a moral judgement must 
always be right for everyone by virtue of its rational status alone. There are to be no 
strings, no attachments on the path to the determination of how we ought to conduct 
ourselves in respect of right and wrong. The laws herein are almost mechanical, and 
therefore universal.  
 
The world of moral law, Kant thought, is different, yet it too, according to the German 
Enlightenment philosopher, must be grounded on some principle(s) which place moral 
judgements at a comparable if not higher level of universality with those that guide 
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empirical experience. In other words, moral judgements, like their counterparts in the 
judgement of sensory experience, ought to have those grounds upon which they are 
objectively true for all people at all times. For moral judgements to be so, they must be 
extricated from idiosyncratic interests of any kind, and their rightness be founded on the 
laws of moral judgement, namely that they be directly related to what alone must be right 
- the moral law - and also emerge from the free will that dictates to us that it is not only 
what we ought to do, but indeed what we must want to do. Thus the only valid ground for 
a moral act ought to be the product of this law, and such product should be not only right 
but also the same for everyone in their right mind, and to it they should strive to adhere. 
Such a law lies in the alliance between reason and (good) will. 
 
The true function of reason, Kant argues, “must be to produce a will which is not merely 
good as a means to some further end, but is good in itself” (Kant 1981, 9, 396). Thus, for 
him, doing our duty, following the demands of reason and doing as we ought, doing what 
alone is right, stands in direct opposition to the directions of desire or what pleases us, 
and to the demands of our sensuous nature. Consequently, to have moral worth, our 
actions must be the direct function of our sense of duty with regard to the act. Inclination 
or habit alone, as customs, including those habits we acquire from memberships of 
specific faiths, often teach us, is not enough to bestow moral worth on our actions, not 
even when the inclination is to do what is our duty. Only the motive of duty bestows 
moral worth on an action. Moral worth has no specific object; rather, it depends, 
according to Kant, “merely on the principle of volition according to which, without 
regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been done” (Kant 1981, 13, 
400). It is not the purpose or goal of the action, but the principle or maxim on the basis of 
which the action is performed, that bestows moral worth on an action. This, in short, is 
what I understand to be, or call, Kant’s idea of autonomy of moral reason. 
 
It is evident that Kant does not suggest that the world is normatively mute, and therefore 
moral norms depend on us. He is clearly and strongly opposed to such an idea. Even as 
Kant seems to argue that the idea of moral worth of actions derives from humans alone, 
such an idea of “derivation” is only in as far as understanding the role of reason in an 
intuitive manner goes. Hair-splitters, such as Charles Larmore (2004; 2008), for example, 
are opposed to Kant, as they are to the framework of thinking in European modernity in 
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general as influenced by the scientific revolution of the time, for mistakenly suggesting 
that so much depends on human reason. For this school, morality is a realm that is 
autonomous of human rational experience itself. In other words, it is part of the higher 
order of the universe. What I think, in very general terms, to be happening with people 
like Larmore, is the unease with claims, usually found with extremist forms of liberalism 
in the Western world, especially in its embrace by libertarians, which claim, in their 
opposition to any form of institutional interference in people’s lives, allegiance to Kant 
for setting the tone in favor of individual reason as the only basis for what should count as 
good and right. Their targets are usually the state, the Church, and customary traditions. Is 
there anything left other than the individual that they do not object to? 
 
The Kantian propositions tally with the libertarian standards and ideals that they alone 
become the basis of our social living. According to the latter, for example, we should 
support an ordinance that grants rights to a group of minorities against prevailing 
prejudices, not because we stand to gain from the consequences of such ordinance, but 
purely on the ground that there is no rational ground in support of a denial. In such a case, 
the act of supporting the rights of a minority group acquires a moral worth because it is 
based purely on the principle that individuals and groups should be granted all rationally 
defined freedoms and rights, so long as they do not pose a threat to similar freedoms and 
rights of others. A moral person, according to Kant, is he/she who acts according to 
principle. Thus, he further says,  “Rather than act on the basis of the desires of the 
moment, the person of principle appeals to a general rule or rationally articulated reason 
in order to ascertain what to do” (Arrington 1998, 266). 
 
Such principle, as we earlier mentioned, must be one that transcends the moment, such as 
a specific goal or self-interests of the actor. Now, I am sure you can apply these principles 
to many issues that we face in our communities today. Here are a few examples: When 
we run for office in our multi-ethnic urban constituencies, we urge voters to make their 
choices based on no other factor than what they expect from the occupier of the office, 
who, in their estimation, is likely to meet such expectations. In other words, we argue, 
sometimes only by implication, that official performance has nothing to do with gender, 
ethnicity, religion, or such narrow interest identities. But now we might ask whether we 
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should not accord the same judgement to persons whose skins do not appear similar to 
our own, whether by race or, as in the case of persons with albinism, by some other factor 
that affects the superficial appearance of our bodies, so long as their capacities are not 
compromised by such conditions. Or why not accord the same rights to social life-styles 
to persons whose preferences are not identical with our own, so long as they break no 
laws in their practices? If you think of these matters deeply, you will be reminded to 
reflect on why we are prone to veer off the course of reason in regard to some specific 
issues in life. And often we have no good reason other than mere prejudice. And 
prejudice against someone on the basis of their ethnicity is neither better nor worse than 
prejudice based on gender, sexual orientation, dietary preferences, or color of skin. If 
prejudice is wrong, oppose its manifestation in any form.  
 
Our opposition to Kant is for a different reason, and it is nearly the basis for our 
opposition to the school that Charles Larmore ascribes to. My point is that our 
rationalization of practical choices should be done with acute awareness of the possible 
implications that the principles of judgement in one situation may have for our choices in 
other situations whose similarities to the former may not always be obvious except by 
analytical thinking, and that we should strive to be consistent where there are sufficient 
indications of similarities of objects of our judgement or choice.9 
 
Here are Kant’s propositions about morality properly speaking: 
(i)  An action must be done from duty in order to have any moral worth. (Inclination 
to preserve life, for example, may be good, and people do it all the time, but such an 
action has no moral worth strictly speaking). 
(ii)  An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be 
attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined. 
(iii)  From (i) and (ii) above, it follows that Duty is the necessity of an action done out 
of respect for the law. I can indeed have an inclination for an object as the effect of my 
                                                
9 I once had a group of students from a racial minority group who were eager to vote for an ordinance that 
was aimed at denying certain rights to gay people until I asked them to consider why the grounds for 
denying gay people those rights, which were not necessarily guaranteed for members of their group, would 
not be applicable to them too. If any set of goods, “g”, can be denied to any group identified by its culture, 
then there would be no ground to exempt any culturally definable group from being equally denied the 
same goods. 
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proposed action; but I can never have respect for such an object, just because it is merely 
an effect and is not an activity of the will” (Kant 1981, 12, 399-400). 
 
The form of the moral principle, according to these propositions, is simply the reverence 
for the law as law. It is the obedience of the law that matters and which must be the 
deciding motive for an action. “Therefore”, Kant says, “the pre-eminent good which is 
called moral can consist in nothing but the representation of the law in itself, and such a 
representation can admittedly be found only in a rational being insofar as this 
representation, and not some expected effect, is the determining ground of the will. This 
good is already present in the person who acts according to this representation, and such 
good need not be awaited merely from the effect” (Kant 1981, 13-14). Thus, if, as in the often 
cited example, a moral imperative has the form of a law like “always tell the truth”, it 
would not matter, in Kant’s eyes, whether doing so will result in the death or some other 
type of harm to oneself or someone else. 
 
Whether they are philosophical or only ordinary, principles of morality are norms, 
rationally determined to guide conduct where it may occur or only imagined to be 
possible. This includes the norm that one ought to ignore any effects of his or her conduct 
when considering the best possible principle. Do we not all think like this when 
considering the best way to determine a course of action that would be fair to all? 
Suppose, for example, that you were a member of a search committee charged with hiring 
someone for a position in your department, and it turns out that one of the applicants is a 
friend and former classmate of your Chair who is not always a very nice person. So you 
think, as may indeed be likely,  that if you hire this person, the Chair will have an ally, 
which could then bolster his already nasty personal attitudes. But the specific applicant 
also happens to be one of your top candidates for the position. Do you argue for the 
exclusion of this applicant on the basis of the possible effects of his/her hiring, or do you 
keep focus on the right qualities that make him/her a candidate? And what if the 
candidate was your friend? What you face is the law of fairness in the process. Should 
his/her possible impact on the department on grounds not relevant to the advertized 
qualifications matter to how you make your decision? 
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The requirement that a moral norm disregard any effects is arrived at by elimination of 
what does or does not matter or apply to creating an ideal condition for everyone, indeed 
anyone involved, not by divine-like intuition. In your deliberations, members of your 
search committee are likely to ask themselves how they themselves would react, if they 
were this candidate, upon discovering that they were hired, or shunned, on account of the 
perception of their possible effect on the department rather than on their relevant 
qualifications. So they try to assess the moral status of such a decision from their 
imagined candidature.  It is helpful to try to see the other person through one’s own 
judgement of the same circumstance by imaginarily being them. But, as you can tell 
already, Kant had no room for the “golden rule” - Do unto others as you would have 
others do unto you - because it requires exactly the opposite of the dictates of the dry duty 
theory. But the golden rule is often the way most people arrive at the framing of the 
idealized or “the absolutely objective” rule, whatever that may be.  But now imagine that 
one of your candidates is a member of a minority group who historically have not had 
equal opportunity for hire at college level. He or she is a good candidate, but not the top 
one, and there are no other mitigating factors than their qualifications. Your job 
advertisement particularly encouraged members of underrepresented groups to apply. 
How, in your view, should your search committee decide on the hire in light of the rule of 
fairness? 
 
Paradoxically, the idea of “absolutely objective” norms is the insight of transcendental 
philosophizing, but also its deepest pitfall, especially in practical matters such as morality 
and politics. By extricating moral knowledge from how people feel about the world and 
experience, Kant’s theory led to and became the reference for moral realism. His own 
position appears to have been built on the metaphysical component of moral realism, but 
later philosophers have contributed the semantic and epistemological components. 
Together, loosely described, they combine to make the claim that there are moral facts, 
complete with properties, that exist independently of people’s beliefs and attitudes about 
what is right and wrong. In this sense, moral realists claim that moral assertions, which 
may include assertions of some moral beliefs, can be true or false, and that, with 
appropriate method, discernment can be made between them. 
 
But, to be sure, opposition to moral realism does not necessarily entail or lead to 
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constructivism in the sense that moral judgements are made around interests and therefore 
lack solid rational grounding beyond what people want or deem useful. Rather, at least 
the version I deem useful, anti-realism, can be construed as the claim that although 
morality is an inextricable part of how human lives are lived (because a humane life is 
essentially human and goes beyond mere survival), moral judgements are of the kind that 
emerge from the human need to formulate the best regulatory principles for their relations 
with the objective of creating a humane atmosphere. This being so, the urge for such 
principles does not arise to an individual in isolation, despite the reflexive character of the 
process for the rational consideration of which of such principles would be best. There are 
realities that humans find upon their appearance in the world, and that would be there no 
matter what else was the case. But there are also other kinds of reality that exist only by 
virtue of human existence, and hence on or by the strength of the practical sociality that 
underlies such existence. To abstract from such conditions allows moral realists, as 
transcendental thinkers, not only to focus on the nature of moral claims or assertions 
themselves, but, by overlooking human imperfections (such as not being able to know in 
advance what kind of humanly generated conditions will pertain and the kind of moral 
concerns they in turn will generate), also to paint a picture of moral ideals that human 
beings could never fully realize. 
 
It is indeed a long time since Kant wrote the Grounding (or Groundwork) for the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Therefore his theoretical forecast as well as what he believed to 
be the strength of the concepts he used may very well be different from our own.  
Consequently, our reading of this work may involve attributing to it different matters of 
importance as well as matters with different importance due to the kind of cases that 
concern us in our own time. Thus our discursive engagement with it today stems from its 
possible effect on someone who observes in our own time competing commentaries on 
cases which indicate the impact of socio-historical variations on specific cultures. 
 
African Traditions and the Place of Reason 
Kant’s notion that the moral law is present only in rational beings allows us to examine 
some recent discourses on African traditions with reference to the grounds - whether 
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explicitly expressed or only implied -  on which they should or should not be respected. 
The key Kantian concept which links his view with that of liberals in the critique of 
tradition is the role of reason. The primary role of reason, we have learned, is not to serve 
limited objects of desire or interest, but to formulate those principles of action which have 
the character of law - meaning, then, that such principles must have the formal 
characteristics of law, namely universality and necessity. Universality, we know from the 
long history of philosophical deliberations on the idea, is the hallmark of reason, whose 
use, in turn, becomes the hallmark of justice and liberty. A truly universal principle, then, 
is one which tells everyone how always to act. Tradition, on the other hand, is limited in 
its application, and addresses matters of specific interests. And as set practices of 
tradition, customs tell us that some things are done in certain ways by members of certain 
groups, and not that they must always be so done by everyone. So we leave everyone to 
do as it may seem best to their customary judgement. Tradition, then, appears to be in 
sharp contrast not only to Kant’s grounding for moral principles, but also to the mission 
of reason itself. 
 
Yet, to be sure, traditions are hardly formulated just so people can do something for the 
sake of it, nor just because groups may be different one from another. They are not 
absurd. What is absurd is the attitude of holding them to be sacrosanct and unadjustable to 
changing and better values and needs. The factual lack of dialogue within and about 
traditions cannot be taken as evidence of traditions’ relativism, or of traditions’ denial of 
individual freedoms.  Kant’s grounding of the moral law in the dictates of reason 
understood in its metaphysical and transcendental abstraction from the social realities of 
its uses appears, in one interpretation, to be remarkably and unrealistically individualist. 
For him it is reason, and reason alone by virtue of its inherent ends, that reveals the 
universality and necessity required of a moral law. Hence, for one to be required to act on 
any maxim, such maxim must have, or must be shown to be capable of having, the form 
of universality and necessity as to be requireable of any person as a necessary basis of 
action. 
 
What one might find paradoxical about those who embrace this position is the account, if 
any, of their embrace of it. In other words, is it embraced for its value of being capable of 
enhancing those conditions viewed to be favorable to the enjoyment of certain values. But 
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if so, would these not constitute motives for preferring the applicable principle? And are 
they not arrived at by way of eliminating potential encumberments to an ideal mode of 
moral agency? Yet Kant writes: 
Therefore, I need no far-reaching acuteness to discern what I have to do in order 
that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world and 
incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself whether I 
can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. If not, then the 
maxim must be rejected, not because of any disadvantage accruing to me or even 
to others, but because it cannot be fitting as a principle in a possible legislation of 
universal law, and reason exacts from me immediate respect for such legislation 
(Kant 1981, 15). 
 
But is that not what we are as human beings? We have neither experience of what the 
world will throw at us nor preparedness for all its contingencies, in their actuality or 
possibilities. But based on the contingencies we know or may be acquainted with, and on 
what we can reasonably forecast and conjecture based on these, we can design fairly 
reasonable maxims of practice, and desire that they, and even strive to make them, apply 
to all cases all the time. But it is a different matter to think that there are, other than this 
desire alone, a priori maxims with specific identities. Good is not a specific “thing”, so it 
does not bear any specific characteristics other than the properties we transfer to it from 
the motivations, attitudes and other inner states of people’s minds as discernible from 
their reaction to specific things and conditions of their worlds. 
 
Libertarians believe, among other things, that there are no specific conditions, other than 
liberty, to which anyone should be compelled to live or act. They prioritize personal 
autonomy while supporting all endeavors, public and private, which extend and sustain 
those conditions under which dignified autonomy becomes the right of everyone. For 
them, as for Kant, nothing is greater in the liberal litany of values than reason as the pillar 
of this autonomy. It is both its resource and manifestation. Historically, most of this rests 
with Protestantism, before it passes through Locke and Kant. While discussing religious 
toleration, Locke argues that what matters most in worship is between the individual and 
their God, because religious faith is a matter of private conviction. Such matters, that is, 
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the inner convictions of the individual, whether they are religious or moral beliefs, remain 
decisively beyond the reach of the government or any other entity that claims political or 
other form of public regulatory authority. 
 
“For the modern liberal”, Appiah adds, “objection to regulation of religion argues that the 
choices I make and the understandings I come to in my own search for religious truth are 
important in part because I chose them in the course of my own search. … it is that what 
it is good for me to do depends, in part, on my reflective appropriation of the beliefs and 
values by which I guide my life” (Appiah 1998, 2-3). These lines can be traced back to those 
pages of In My Father’s House (Appiah 1992) which narrate the defiant standoff between 
Appiah and the authority of his matriclan, the abusua. Preferring the retinue of tradition 
to the personal will of the senior Appiah, and in disregard of the reflective choices and 
values of the younger Appiahs, the abusua, in the person of the senior Appiah’s sister, did 
as much as it could to claim authority in determining the order of funerary matters for her 
brother. The social lines of the discord in the narrative are obvious, such as narrated in the 
text (Appiah 1992, 184). 
 
There must be another way of looking at how good lives are produced. In apparent 
concordance with Kant’s separation of object or content of the moral principle, what he 
calls its goals or effects, from its form, that is, its universality and necessity, Kwasi 
Wiredu (1996) makes a distinction between custom and morality proper. In other words, 
he draws a distinction between the relativity of fact and the objectivity or universality of 
value. The paradoxicality of human embodiment allows for cultural variations in some 
specific human beliefs and practices while the fundamental basis of these beliefs, as 
different from their immediate objects, and which Wiredu considers to be the crucial 
point about being human, remains universally the same for all the members of the species 
(see Wiredu 1983; 1995). For him as for Kant, such universality is grounded in the universality of 
the form – that is, that moral rules, like rules of thought, are attuned to the function of the 
human species – in which ideal human life incorporates considerations of humaneness 
rather than mere survival. 
 
Then, just as sharply, Wiredu would switch toward the embrace of Dewey’s evolutionary 
pragmatism, namely that such human condition demands a synthetic rather than an a 
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priori approach, or, in other words, openness to how reason becomes applicable to the 
determination of the best outcomes from specific situations. This is what accounts for 
Wiredu’s agreement with Dewey regarding the latter’s foundation of logic in the 
biological complexity of humans as an instrument for the successful attainment of human 
communication based on the use of rules of speech and sense-making. He criticizes 
Hume’s denial of any value to induction as inconsistent since Hume appeared to realize, 
despite his rejection of induction, that it was a crucial principle of how humans deal with 
matters of fact. On the other hand, he argues that he would agree with Kant’s categorical 
imperative only if an “injection of a dose of compassion into [it] would convert it into a 
principle of sympathetic impartiality” (Wiredu 1996). 
 
According to Wiredu, it is not hard to see the practical strength of such a principle (of 
sympathetic impartiality), since “it takes little imagination to foresee that life in any 
society in which everyone openly avowed the contrary of this principle and acted 
accordingly inevitably would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish’, and probably short” 
(Wiredu 1996, 29). According to this view, Kant’s categorical imperative would thus 
have made more sense if it had been openly built on this human biological principle 
which “is a human universal transcending cultures viewed as social forms and customary 
beliefs and practices. In being common to all human practice of morality, it is a universal 
of any non-brutish form of human life” (Wiredu 1996, 29). Here, Wiredu builds on what 
is well-known to be particularly underdeveloped in Kant’s enterprise. In other words, 
despite Kant’s stress on the mind’s discovery, within itself, of its own unity, that of the 
world, and the unity of the world and mind in experience, it still seemed as though Kant 
were moving from this personal experience to suggestions of its supposed universality 
without adequate ontological grounds transcending the individual psyche. Wiredu 
attempts to close that gap by suggesting that the unity between the particular and the 
universal does not reside in the abstract. Rather, it is in the biological unity of the species. 
 
For Wiredu, both cognitive and moral capacities of humans are the function of the 
organically specific type that humans are. Mind, the seat of cognitive and moral reason, is 
the function of this specific biological condition whose accomplishment (in the specific 
order proper to being human) depends on the social basis of being properly human. 
142 D.A. Masolo 
Reason resides in the social nature of humans, not in the unity of individual mind; it 
springs from and prospers by virtue of the act of communication.  In fact, if a person were 
to be isolated from society and deprived of communication with other humans from birth, 
he/she would be confined to a “solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish”, and probably also very 
short life.  
 
The source of morality proper, Wiredu (1983) argues, cannot be in the supernatural. It is 
neither the deities, the ancestors, nor the taboos to which are attributed the non-human 
powers to exact sanctions on those who have committed aberrations.  “Justification of 
behavior can [therefore] only take the form of relating it to rules. [And] Obviously, the 
rules cannot be justified by reference to themselves but only by reference to higher order 
rules, where possible, and in other cases, to considerations more general than any specific 
rule of conduct” (Wiredu 1983, 7). In other words, justification of moral behavior must be 
sought in the discourses through and by which meanings and effects of behavior are 
examined and determined against specific and general motives of people in social 
settings. They are embedded in cultural practice. Obviously, Wiredu presents a 
communitarian foundation for the values that people enjoy as humans. Even reason, as 
the formal and practical capacity by which we organize the means and content of 
communication, would be mute without the facilitation of the community. In morality, as 
in the broader political order, what is accepted as the governance of behavior is the 
function  “not of any supposed divine inspiration but rather of whatever intrinsic 
persuasiveness [members’] ideas may have. .... Now, this adherence to the principle of 
consensus was a premeditated option. It was based on the belief that ultimately the 
interests of all members of society are the same, although their immediate perceptions of 
those interests may be different” (Wiredu 1996, 185). 
 
Imagine, once more, what is referred to in my language as a“jadak-kende” - the monadic 
individual - for whom there are no boundaries to the extent of needs and wants. He or she 
does not pair “can do” with “cannot do” in their moral senses, for the simple reason that 
they would not arise in the absence of a conflictual social situation. Their moral meanings 
originate in social circumstances in which other people’s interests suddenly become a 
reality to be accorded consideration, especially when they are at variance with one’s own 
interests. A “jadak-kende” is an amoral person. Thus consideration of the “can do” and 
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“cannot do” regarding his/her actions will be limited to questions of his/her own abilities 
to carry out his/her plans, or to whether and why any of his/her plans should take 
precedence over others. In the minimum, communitarians claim that morality is not innate 
in the sense of preceding the presence of humans among fellow humans. Even in our 
remotest imagination, thoughts of morality as being autonomous of human desiring and 
effecting moral maxims in real situations is possible only as abstraction from known real 
situations, not in a vacuum. 
 
The idea of a  “jadak-kende” (the individual as a windowless monad) can only be 
allegorical. Chances are that even the purely conjectural idea of an “original state” is 
made possible only by our ruminations on the real.  Morality too is about standards and 
expectations, however low, high, unusual, or outright weird. The idea of the imaginary 
“jadak-kende” is that there are some matters of conduct about which we can afford some 
close-to-absolute liberty in the absence of other people (such as eating my meal while 
absolutely naked, so long as my door and windows securely keep me from any form of 
intrusion of the outside world), because the maxims that impose expectations on one’s 
conduct would not apply under those circumstances. So you can experiment being a 
“jadak-kende” inside your space, whatever and wherever it may be, alone, with your door 
and windows locked and blinded to the outside world. Now imagine that condition to be 
the permanent and normative state of human existence. Would you still have norms? 
About what? To what ends, or to control who? 
 
Conclusion 
Metaphysics has always been a fascinating subject. But it has undergone a radical 
transformation over the years. Gone are the days when human nature was typically 
explicated in neglect of the concerns of real people in social and historical realities. Gone 
are the times when bodily characteristics  required to live in society and in time was 
considered a contingent property of human experience. Admittedly, any theory of the self 
will be abstract, but it does not have to be a construct of an entity that is out of touch with 
everyday encounters in which one is either a perpetrator or victim of the use of the 
mechanisms of socio-political fragmentation. The substantial self, by contrast, as we see 
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in one’s quest to have a grip of who one is and in one’s quest to have a grip of what the 
world around one is and how to deal with it, is an entity that is constantly in a struggle to 
self-constitute in a sea of processes laid down by other selves in similar struggles, and by 
institutions that impose norms by and on the basis of which these struggles are carried 
out. In these processes, the self is either a violator or a victim of others’ violations. 
 
One’s intersubjective condition allows one to be both an individual and a dependent 
member of a social world defined by an exchange between its inhabitants. Maybe the 
abstract self can construct a sense of moral propriety without thinking of his/her own fate 
as someone whose arms, or those of his/her child or neighbor, have been severed off by 
someone who thinks that his/her real life is nothing but a mirage, that he/she is only a 
ghost, or that his/her imaginary absence is not different from dying under the brutality of 
a machette-wielding attacker. “Conceptualizing the self as an abstract metaphysical 
entity”, writes Fred C. Alford, “leads to a way of thinking that in the end values not the 
self but the abstract principles from which it is derived” (Alford 1991, 2). 
 
I have tried to propose a communitarian alternative for thinking about subjecthood. Those 
of my readers who have followed recent discussions in African philosophy will make 
these connections, and I boldly suggest that this alternative includes the work of Kwame 
Appiah. Admittedly, there are different strands of communitarianism, and there is some 
difference between Western and African strands of this ethic. The various strands are 
however united in their opposition to the familiar individualistic or impersonal conception 
of the person, or their opposition to a purely libertarian conception of society. Shivji 
(1986), for example, led a socialist understanding of law that saw it not as an autonomous 
system of statutes and regulations, but rather as a body of principles whose subject matter 
is the interests of real people. So when we talk of justice, it is crucial to try to find out 
what a group of people’s moral psychology is about some good. Sometimes people may 
not exactly be opposed to sharing any said good with other people, but they need to be 
told, through analytic deliberation, that conflict is engendered primarily by an insufficient 
understanding of the implications of our actions upon others, or by the conflict between 
our interests and those of others which we decline to take into serious consideration. 
 
At the 2008 APA (American Philosophical Association) meetings, I was invited to give a 
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paper on a panel on “African Communitarianism”, and I took a stand for which I have 
been chided for exhibiting an embrace of the now well-known hybridity theory of identity 
propounded by Homi Bhabha (1994) as a key element of his post-colonial theory. Failure 
to articulate my own position more fully and more carefully may have justified such 
chiding, as I previously may have given too much focus to only one strand of 
communitarianism, namely the identity communitarianism, especially to the dangers of 
some of its misunderstandings at the expense of the other and equally important two 
strands, viz., virtue communitarianism and social-political communitarianism. 
 
By focusing on identity communitarianism, I had intended to dismantle some of the 
essentialist pitfalls we inherited from Victorian anthropology, and to show the 
significance of negative moral implications of holding onto particular group identities as 
if they were part of non-human nature. Several people have similarly argued that 
essentialist perceptions of identity lie at the root of, and are at least partly responsible for, 
the hatred and violence against specific groups as we witnessed in the period from World 
War II until just recently (see e.g. Maalouf 2000; Sen). The reader probably knows someone who 
was involved in this kind of barbarism as either victim or perpetrator. I argued, against 
this view of identity, that we are never one thing, if ever we could know what those 
“things” really are. Unfortunately, we do not know, because, as any little reflection on the 
migratory history of humanity will show, there is no such identity for anyone. Instead, 
identities are characterizations we embrace and constantly transform in the course of our 
lives and engagements with other people equally hybridized like ourselves. Those of us 
who live and work in environments where group identities are not only problematic in 
their corresponding relations to value systems of the establishments, but are also a 
reminder of the ugly pasts, know how sensitive group identity claims can be. They are no 
more or less political than our own identities have been in service of our complex 
histories of migrations and settlements many times over. 
 
Identity communitarianism makes the claim that certain strands of liberalism contain a 
faulty notion of the person because they give insufficient space to particularistic group 
identities. This strand could be identified with what is now known as “rootless 
cosmopolitan liberalism”, and is espoused by theoreticians who have their national 
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political establishments as the only large-scale groups they can identify with, but which 
they claim to be unnecessary to individual freedoms. These liberals either are, or are 
cognates of libertarians. By the same token, some identity communitarians fail to notice, 
and definitely fail to warn, of the lurking dangers of claiming group identities as 
metaphysical characteristics. 
 
Thus while morally defined identity communitarianism is desirable as a choice to commit 
to specific cultural modes identified only as roots that one feels proud to identify with and 
live by as based on positive group values, moral derivations of a metaphysically defined 
identity communitarianism tends to place those identified as different in socially, morally, 
and politically disadvantaged relations with oneself. It often results in hierarchized social 
order that generates conflict such as we have seen across the globe over the past decade-
and-a-half or two. To highlight these dangers, I have argued a stationless or hybridized 
idea of community, not just in post-colonial terms as Bhabha does, but as the driving 
dynamic in the experiences of real people defined by their multiple roles. Identity 
communitarianism is about having roots, which we keep and carry with us as we journey 
across other cultures, but which, nonetheless, are not immutable. Earlier, and in some 
more recent work, I have drawn attention to virtue communitarianism as well. Because of 
its recurrence in virtue theory as part of contemporary moral concerns, it is the best 
known and most widely discussed aspect of communitarianism whose emphasis is the 
communal rather than the purely individual character of virtue. 
 
Finally, in regard to the third type of communitarianism, namely the social-political one, 
there could not be a better audience to remind about this than a conference in Dar Es 
Salaam, Tanzania, albeit recent deviations and allures have tended to distract Tanzanians 
from it. This is the view that the primary end of a society or polity is to promote, 
encourage and embody the principle that certain goods ought to be shared equally across 
such polity, whether it is investment in infrastructural amenities, or the provision of jobs, 
or the establishment of educational facilities, and other means and modalities for 
improving the people’s well-being, without fear or favour, as a fundamental obligation of 
the polity as a collective entity. My quest, then, is that our search for philosophical 
resources be focused on our own societies because we have enough evil to mull over, and 
enough examples of preceding good thinking to guide us in the direction of defining what 
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is or are good for our societies. We cannot be the only place on earth where good is not 
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